Transition from black to official markets for foreign exchange in Myanmar by Kubo Koji
Transition from black to official markets for
foreign exchange in Myanmar
著者 Kubo Koji
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 511
year 2015-03-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1420
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Myanmar, exchange rate unification, black market for foreign exchange, 
economies of scope in banking 
JEL classification: O24, O53, E26 
  
* Senior Research Fellow, Bangkok Research Center, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan 
External Trade Organization (Koji_Kubo@jetro.go.jp) 
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 511 
Transition from black to official 
markets for foreign exchange in 
Myanmar 
 
Koji KUBO* 
 
March 2015 
Abstract  
We address the puzzle why the black market for foreign exchange thrives in 
Myanmar despite the successful unification of multiple exchange rates. A closer look 
at the black market reveals that its enduring competitiveness stems from its lower 
transaction costs. A question arising from this observation is how the official market, 
namely banks, can compete with and replace the black market. Our empirical 
analysis based on an original questionnaire survey of private export firms regarding 
their choices of currency trading modes suggests that banks can attract exporters by 
exploiting the economies of scope between currency trading and lending. 
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Transition from Black to Official Markets for Foreign Exchange in Myanmar 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Black (or informal or parallel) markets for foreign exchange are a widespread 
phenomenon in developing countries. The literature points out two spectra of policies 
that give rise to the black markets. One is exchange rate regimes whereby authorities 
target the exchange rate to a specific level or band, leading to excess demand for foreign 
exchange and rationing in the official market (Kiguel and O’Connell 1995). The other is 
restrictions on foreign trade transactions and capital controls, bringing in demand for 
illegal imports and investments and pertinent illegal trading of foreign exchange 
(Agenor and Haque 1996). These policies bring about the distortions characterised by 
the black market premium, i.e., the percentage by which the black market exchange rate 
exceeds the official exchange rate. 
For policy reforms to eliminate these distortions associated with foreign exchange 
black markets, unification of exchange rates is often set as an intermediate target. 
Kiguel and O’Connell (1995) document that reforms in exchange rate regimes 
eliminated the black market premium in several developing countries. However, 
existing studies rarely refer to the consequences of the black markets after such reforms. 
Unification of exchange rates does not always coincide with dissolution of the black 
market for foreign exchange, which is particularly the case for Myanmar. In April 2012, 
bold reforms were implemented to the exchange rate regime and the restrictions on 
international trade in Myanmar; authorities abolished the peg of the Myanmar kyat, the 
legal tender of the country, to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and introduced a managed float as well as liberalised trade 
transactions. While the reforms largely eliminated the black market premium, the selling 
and buying of foreign exchange outside the banking system has persisted. 
The black market for foreign exchange hampers accumulation of international 
reserves, even if it does not impose distortions on the economy as long as exchange 
rates are unified. Participants in the black market maintain foreign exchange in their 
possession. Such decentralised holdings of foreign exchange prevent from accumulation 
of a country’s official reserves. As for Myanmar, considering the country’s dependence 
on natural resource exports and vulnerability to external shocks, the IMF (2013, 8) 
assesses that the appropriate coverage of international reserves is five to six months of 
imports, whereas the actual coverage is three to four months of imports. In general, 
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international reserves play a role in buffering external shocks. Furthermore, 
international reserves serve as collateral when the country seeks official sources of 
external financing. From the viewpoint of international reserves, transferring foreign 
currency trading from outside the banking sector to the official market is a challenge for 
Myanmar. 
A closer look at the black market in Myanmar reveals that its lower transaction costs 
in terms of narrow bid-ask spreads attract both sellers and buyers. During two and a half 
decades of the peculiar fixed exchange rate regime, the banking sector had not traded 
foreign exchange with private firms. As a result, a large pool of buyers and sellers 
emerged in the black market that have traded foreign currency mutually outside the 
banking system, which has made it easy to find counterparties for foreign currency 
trading as well as reduced the transaction costs.  
A research question arising from these observations is how the banks can compete 
with and replace the black market. As the reform has paved the way for Myanmar’s 
private banks to engage in foreign exchange trading, several exporters started to sell 
their export earnings to the banks. To see how exporters choose modes for currency 
conversion, we conducted a questionnaire survey of exporters. In particular, we 
empirically investigate how the relationship between exporters and banks affects the 
exporters’ choices of currency trading modes.  
The preliminary empirical results based on the questionnaire survey suggest that the 
firms taking domestic currency loans from banks are more ready to engage in foreign 
exchange trading with banks, implying the possibility of economies of scope in the 
banking business between currency trading and lending operations. The economies of 
scope could yield a means for the banks to compete with the black market. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
related literature and present three dimensions of the black market for foreign exchange. 
We discuss that the elimination of the premium between the official and black market 
exchange rates does not necessarily coincide with the elimination of the black market. 
In Section 3, we overview the structure of Myanmar’s foreign exchange market before 
and after the April 2012 reforms, and illustrate that the enduring competitiveness of the 
black market stems from its lower transaction cost. In Section 4, we present preliminary 
empirical results of the survey of private exporters regarding their choices of currency 
trading modes and discuss that banks can attract exporters by exploiting economies of 
scope between currency trading and lending. In Section 5, we summarise the analysis 
and conclude this paper. 
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2. Review of the Related Literature 
 
The existing literature illustrates that the black (or informal or parallel) market for 
foreign exchange emerges as a result of two spectra of policies. One is exchange rate 
arrangements, whereby authorities target the exchange rate to a specific level or band 
(Kiguel and O’Connell 1995). When the official exchange rate overvalues the domestic 
currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies, excess demand would arise for foreign exchange 
in the official market. Authorities then need to restrict access to the official market, 
which in turn leads to the emergence of the black market wherein foreign exchange is 
traded at a premium. To maintain the supply of foreign exchange in the official market, 
authorities need to tighten the surrender requirements on export earnings; otherwise, 
exporters would channel their export earnings to the black market for higher returns 
until the exchange rates in two markets equilibrate. As the premium on the black market 
exchange rate rises, the tighter are the controls that authorities need to implement.1 
The other policy area involves restrictions on foreign trade transactions and capital 
controls (Agenor and Haque 1996). There are several components in this category of 
policies. One is the controls on imports by quotas, and another is high tariffs and taxes 
on imports. Yet another is capital controls that restrict domestic residents’ holdings of 
foreign assets. To circumvent these restrictions, domestic residents turn to the black 
market, whereby they raise foreign exchange to settle payments for illegal purchases of 
restricted foreign goods and foreign assets. 
These two strands of policies are sometimes implemented simultaneously in some 
developing countries and transition economies, which necessitate comprehensive 
reforms to unify exchange rates. China in the 1980s and the early 1990s serves as a 
good example. China initiated foreign exchange policy reforms in 1981 to transform the 
administrative allocation of foreign exchange to a dual-exchange-rate system with a 
partial market mechanism, and in January 1994, the official exchange rates were unified 
and a managed float was introduced (Mehran et al. 1996; Huang and Wang 2004). 
Regardless of this unification of official rates, foreign exchange trading in the black 
market was widespread both throughout and after the reform periods. Ding (1998) 
documents that the black market fulfilled demand for capital flight, especially to Hong 
Kong, as well as demand for smuggling imports, and that informal brokers matched the 
demand and supply of foreign exchange. Phylaktis and Girardin (2001) show that the 
black market premium did not fall below 10 percent until China deregulated regulations 
                                                   
1 A typical case is Jamaica, as studied by Grosse (1994). 
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on foreign trade and capital controls towards accession to the World Trade Organization. 
 Whatever is the root cause of the black market for foreign exchange, illegal trade is 
the primary source and use of foreign exchange in the black market. Exporters seeking 
to obtain a higher return from their sales of foreign exchange use illegal trade such as 
under-invoicing and smuggling to channel their export earnings to the black market.2 3 
Furthermore, when importers’ access to the official foreign exchange market is 
restricted, they resort to illegal imports using foreign exchange raised in the black 
market. 
According to the empirical study by Buehn and Eichler (2011), while the illegal trade 
and the pertinent foreign currency transactions in the black market are typically 
motivated by the black market premium, we need to look at the deterrents to black 
market transactions such as the risk of detection and costs of punishment. Their 
empirical study suggests that high financial penalties effectively act as a deterrent to 
illegal trade, thus, are the pertinent black market transactions of foreign exchange. 
Apart from policies concerning exchange rate and those concerning the uses and 
sources of foreign exchange, an additional dimension of black markets is shaped by the 
regulation as to permission for foreign exchange trading. It is illegal for buyers and 
sellers to engage in foreign exchange trading with those not having an authorised dealer 
licence. Banks are the most common authorised dealers, who operate under regulations 
allowing them to sell and buy foreign currency only for (from) legitimate use (source). 
Foreign exchange trading with unauthorised parties can be motivated by the black 
market premium and illegal sources and uses of foreign exchange. Conversely, market 
participants might prefer the black market for other reasons, in particular a lower 
transaction cost and a narrower bid-ask spread compared with the official market. For 
example, when authorities issue foreign exchange dealer licences to a small number of 
banks, they many seek oligopolistic rents in currency trading by setting a wide bid-ask 
spread, which in turn give rise to currency trading outside banks. 
Table 1 summarises three dimensions of the black market for foreign exchange. The 
black market transactions motivated by the black market premium (1st dimension) and 
                                                   
2 Trade mis-invoicing is a common vehicle for illegal trade (Patnaik, Gupta, and Shah 2012). 
Exporters can under-report to the Customs the value of exports, and the deviation between the true 
value and reported value can be retained and sold in the black market for foreign exchange. 
Importers can seek to partially circumvent the high tariff and tax on imports by under-reporting to 
the Customs the value of imports. For the reported amount, they can settle the payment with foreign 
exchange from the official market; for the unreported amount, they have to raise foreign exchange in 
the black market.  
3 Apart from the mis-invoicing of the exports of legal goods, illegal exports include smuggling of 
illegal goods such as narcotics. Narcotics smuggling was the main source of the foreign exchange in 
Colombia’s black market for foreign exchange (Grosse 1992). 
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illegal sources and uses of foreign exchange (2nd dimension) should always combine the 
third dimension of unauthorised trading counterpart. This is because authorised dealers 
do not sell and buy foreign exchange for (from) illegal use (source) nor at prices outside 
the regulated band.  
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
In contract, the black market comprising unauthorised trading counterpart may not 
combine the other two dimensions when foreign exchange for (from) legitimate use 
(source) is traded at prices within the ask-bid spreads of the official market. Such black 
market transactions are usually cash-based, for small amounts, including overseas travel 
expenditures of residents. Nonetheless, depending on foreign exchange regulations, 
such transactions can take place between exporters and importers for large amount 
transactions, which appear to be the case in Myanmar. 
The literature of the microstructure of foreign exchange market4 sheds some light on 
bid-ask spreads. The literature usually focuses on changes in spreads over time, not on 
the differences in the spreads between markets.5 It is well proven that the spreads of a 
certain foreign exchange market expand along with the volatility of the exchange rate. 
Glassman (1987) accounts how the bid-ask spreads reflect the costs of the immediacy 
(liquidity) service of foreign exchange dealers, which consist of the overhead, the 
inventory costs of foreign exchange, and the risk premium of the open position 
associated with the inventory.  
In light of this literature, the narrow spreads of the black market can be associated 
with its market structure. If matched by informal brokers who do not need to maintain 
own inventory of liquidities, buyers and sellers of foreign exchange can economise on 
the dealer charges in terms of the bid-ask spreads. In sharp contrast with foreign 
exchange dealer banks in other countries that obtain considerable profits from currency 
trading with retail customers (exporters and importers),6 banks in the countries with a 
black market face adverse conditions for currency trading.  
 
 
                                                   
4 See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a survey of this literature. 
5 Few studies have examined the differences in spreads across countries. Melvin and Tan (1996) 
show that the currency market of higher country risk has a larger spread. However, their study only 
focuses at spreads in the official exchange rates and does not include black markets. 
6 Ammer and Brunner (1994) show that the major banks in the United States obtained 20 percent of 
their profits from foreign currency trading with retail customers, whereas their taking open positions 
in foreign currency was not a significant source of profits. 
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3. Myanmar’s Black Market for Foreign Exchange and the April 2012 Reforms  
 
  In Myanmar, as the black market for foreign exchange is a legacy of the past 
exchange rate regime and restrictions on international trade transactions, we first review 
how these policies shaped the black market prior to the reforms in April 2012. We then 
summarise the reforms and illustrate the current status of the black and official markets 
for foreign exchange. 
 
3.1 Before the April 2012 Reforms 
In September 1988, Myanmar started to transition from a variant of a centrally 
planned economy to a market-based economy. However, the transition was incomplete 
as central control of foreign exchange allocation in the state sector was maintained just 
as in the previous centrally planned regime; in principle, export proceeds of state 
economic enterprises (SEEs) were surrendered to the state budget and were rationed 
under strict import controls within the ministerial departments and SEEs.7 The official 
exchange rate had been pegged to the SDR at 8.51 kyat per SDR, which was applied for 
fiscal accounting of such administrative allocation of foreign exchange (IMF 2012).  
In the private sector, foreign trade was legalised in 1988 as part of the transition to a 
market-based economy. Initially, private exporters were required to surrender 40 percent 
of their export revenues at the official exchange rate, which overvalued the kyat, and 
they were entitled to retain only 60 percent of export revenues. As early as 1989, the 
surrender requirement was abolished, and authorities introduced an explicit tax on 
exports.8 
Despite the legalisation of international trade, no official facility existed for private 
exporters and importers to convert foreign currencies to the domestic currency, the kyat, 
or vice-versa. The state banks, namely the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and 
Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB),9 offered international banking 
services including current international payments and transfers. However, they did not 
engage in foreign exchange trading with private firms. The MFTB specialised in 
international settlement operations and had no operations in the domestic currency. 
                                                   
7 For details of the problem in budgetary operations, see Kubo (2013). 
8 The export tax consisted of an 8 percent commercial tax and a 2 percent income tax. See Myat 
Thein (2004) for details of Myanmar’s foreign exchange management in the earlier period. 
9 The MFTB had a head office in Yangon but had no branches. The MICB had a head office in 
Yangon, and a branch in Mandalay. Thus, the bulk of export proceeds of the private sector were 
administratively concentrated at the state banks’ three offices. For exceptional cases including the 
international trade via land borders, international banking services were provided by another state 
bank, the Myanma Economic Bank (MEB), which had branches in the border areas.  
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While the MICB had operations in the domestic currency as well as foreign currencies, 
it lacked the managerial capacity to set foreign exchange buying and selling rates in the 
face of the rigid overvalued official exchange rate. 
As a result, private firms had no choice but to turn to the black market for currency 
conversion. Initially, a common mode of trading export revenues was for private 
exporters to import goods on behalf of importers, and then receive payments from the 
importers from their domestic currency revenues. Frequent disputes arose between the 
buyers and sellers in this trading method regarding payments of import taxes and 
penalties arising from misconduct in customs clearance of imports. To provide a remedy 
for the problem, authorities tolerated domestic account transfers of export-earning 
foreign currency deposits (FCD) around 2006. Consequently, exporters sold official 
export earnings to importers by account transfers of foreign currency deposits. From the 
regulatory viewpoint, such foreign exchange trading was illegal, though tolerated. 
While the official exchange rate grossly overvalued the kyat against foreign 
currencies, its impact on the private firms was modest. The kyat’s official peg to the 
SDR had not been adjusted since 1974, while the kyat had depreciated chronically in the 
black market due to Myanmar’s high inflation. In September 2007, the kyat depreciated 
to 1,300 kyat per US dollar in the black market, whereas the official rate was 5.6303 
kyat per US dollar. However, no surrender requirement on the private sector’s export 
proceeds had existed since 198910 or foreign exchange allocation to private importers at 
the official exchange rate, so that the official exchange rate was largely irrelevant to the 
private sector. 
Apart from the official peg of the kyat, two notable administrative controls were 
imposed on foreign exchange and international trade in the private sector. First, 
domestic residents were prohibited from holding foreign currency cash, and private 
exporters were required to receive payments at one of the two state banks, the MFTB 
and MICB, and maintain them as FCD. At these banks, 10 percent of export proceeds 
were deducted as an export tax. While firms were permitted to maintain export revenues 
after tax as FCD and use them for imports or conduct domestic account transfers later, 
they were prohibited from withdrawing FCD in either foreign currency notes or 
domestic currency notes. 
Second, private sector imports had been subject to licensing for each shipment. In 
July 1997, authorities tightened the issuance of import licences by mandating the 
licence applicants to submit export-earning FCD in the full amount of their import bills. 
                                                   
10 Some exceptional cases exist where private firms were forced to sell foreign exchange to the state 
at the exchange rate designated by the authorities. 
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This requirement to use only export-earning FCD for imports was referred to as the 
“export-first and import-second” policy.  
These administrative controls on the private sector led to the emergence of two 
segments in the black market for foreign exchange. One segment was for export-earning 
FCD which could be used for imports through the official channel, and the other 
segment was for other sources of foreign exchange that could not be used for official 
imports but only for illegal imports. As for the segment of black market for 
export-earning FCD, as mentioned earlier, authorities tolerated domestic account 
transfers of FCD, which facilitated transactions in the black market. When exporters 
sold FCD to importers, the former instructed the state banks to make an account transfer 
of the FCD to the latter’s accounts, and in exchange the latter made payment in the kyat 
to the former. Furthermore, export-earning FCD traded in the black market could be 
used for imports though the official channel, so that FCD trading in the black market 
was not necessarily motivated by illegal trade. 
In general, when authorities restrict sources and uses of foreign exchange, it leads to 
segmentation of the foreign exchange market and multiple exchange rates 
(Canales-Kriljenko 2004). This is particularly the case in Myanmar. Figure 1 shows the 
black market price trends in the kyat of two types of dollar-denominated assets, namely 
export-earning FCD and US dollar notes. The figure illustrates that the export-earning 
FCD was usually priced with a premium over the US dollar notes. Nevertheless, some 
periods existed in which the FCD was priced lower than the US dollar notes. The price 
disparity was due to the lack of arbitrage between FCD and US dollar note markets. 
Thus, in addition to the segmentation between the official and black markets for foreign 
exchange, the black market was further segmented by the restrictions in Myanmar. 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
In terms of actual practices of transactions in the black market for foreign exchange, 
two modes of trading existed regardless of the segments for export-earning FCD and for 
others. One mode was that informal brokers mediated between buyers and sellers and 
quoted prices for foreign exchange. Usually, a broker would not buy or sell foreign 
exchange on his/her own account, but introduce a buyer to a seller and vice versa and 
warrant the contract between two parties, taking a small commission from both. Major 
brokers quoted buying and selling rates and disseminated their price information 
widely.11 
                                                   
11 Such quoted prices are disseminated by short message services of mobile phones to subscribers, 
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The other mode was that a buyer and seller would directly negotiate the price of 
foreign exchange between themselves, referring to brokers’ quoted prices. In some cases, 
exporters and importers initiated foreign exchange trading via mediation by brokers and 
then entered into direct trading once they built mutual trust. With direct trading, buyers 
and sellers could save the brokers commission, but at the price of bearing the risk of 
contract delinquency themselves. 
In summary, due to the peculiar exchange rate regime that focused on foreign 
exchange administration in the state sector at the rigid official exchange rate, the black 
market had been the only means for currency conversion in the private sector. 
Furthermore, the restrictions on foreign exchange and trade brought about further 
segmentation within the foreign exchange black market. On the other hand, authorities 
tolerated trading of export-earning FCD in the black market and permitted imports 
through the official channel using FCD raised in the black market. 
 
3.2 After the April 2012 Reforms 
Since the new government took office in March 2011, reforms have been made to the 
exchange rate regime and the restrictions on international trade. In the state sector, 
however, while the administrative exchange rate for fiscal accounting was devalued 
from the one pegged to the SDR to the level close to the black market rate, central 
administrative allocation of foreign exchange budget has remained. As the state sector 
does not yet participate in the black or official foreign exchange market, the following 
analysis focuses on the private sector. 
As for the exchange rate regime, in April 2012, the Central Bank abolished the 
official peg of the kyat to the SDR and introduced a managed float. Now the Central 
Bank conducts daily foreign exchange auctions and announces the daily reference rate, 
which is determined in the auctions. The Central Bank reference rate constitutes the new 
official rate. The auction is two-way, and the Central Bank calls for bids and offers of 
foreign exchange from authorised dealer banks. 
In November 2011, the Central Bank granted foreign exchange dealer licences to 11 
local private banks with an aim to incorporate black market transactions into the official 
market.12 In July 2012, foreign exchange dealer licences were activated, which allowed 
the authorised dealer banks to undertake international banking operations such as 
current international payments and transfers, accept FCD, and deal in foreign exchange 
with customers at prices within a range of ± 0.8 percent of the Central Bank’s 
                                                                                                                                                     
and local newspapers publish these quotes. 
12 In August 2012, the Central Bank granted licences to three more local private banks. 
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reference rate. This paved the way for banks to engage in foreign currency trading. 
We can summarise the architecture of the official foreign exchange market 
comprising retail and wholesale transactions. For the retail market, exporters and 
importers can trade foreign exchange with authorised dealer banks. The foreign 
exchange auction is the wholesale market that allows authorised dealer banks to adjust 
their foreign exchange inventories. The auction also offers a means for the Central Bank 
to intervene in the market to smooth fluctuations in exchange rates.  
As for reforms concerning restrictions on international trade, authorities lifted the 
“export-first and import-second” policy by the end of April 2012. Importers were no 
longer required to submit export-earnings FCD to obtain an import licence. The banks 
began to accept orders from importers for current international payments using foreign 
exchange of any sources. 
The reforms to the exchange rate regime and international trade restrictions affected 
exchange rates trends drastically. First, Figure 1 in the previous subsection clearly 
shows that the black market rate for export-earning FCD converged to the black market 
rate for US dollar notes in May 2012. Second, in Figure 2 below which illustrates the 
trends of the Central Bank reference rate and the black market rate for US dollar notes, 
we can see that the Central Bank reference rate has mostly merged with the black 
market rate. Thus, we can conclude that the reforms have mostly unified the official and 
black market exchange rates and dissolved the segmentation of the black market. 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
However, transactions in the official foreign exchange market, both retail and 
wholesale, have remained sluggish. Table 2 provides some metrics of official market 
activity in comparison with the size of international trade by the private sector in 2014. 
Customer dealings of authorised dealer banks include both banks’ selling and buying of 
foreign exchange with exporters and importers. Thus, if all exporters sell their export 
revenues to the banks and all importers buy foreign exchange from the banks, the ratio 
of customer dealing turnover to private exports should be two. Due to data 
unavailability, we had to compare the trade data and the official market turnover data in 
different periods. The ratio of the monthly average customer dealings of banks to 
private exports was low at 0.25, implying widespread transactions outside the official 
market. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
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Why is the black market for foreign exchange so widespread? One reason could be 
the price competitiveness. Table 3 compares the black market rates for US dollar with 
the official market rates. In this table, the export earnings rates are the black market rate 
for export-earning FCD. The export earnings rates and US dollar notes rates are quotes 
by an informal dealer in the black market. The authorised dealer bank rates are the 
official market prices, which a bank sets within the prescribed range from the Central 
Bank’s reference rate; the rates may differ slightly between banks. The spreads between 
selling and buying rates are smaller in the black market. When informal brokers 
intermediate between the buyers and sellers, their commission is usually one kyat per 
dollar, or nearly 0.1 percent. Furthermore, if the transaction amount is large, they set the 
commission rate at 0.5 kyat per dollar, or even lower.13 In contrast, the authorised 
dealer banks usually set the spreads at nearly 1 percent. Therefore, it is more attractive 
for both the foreign exchange buyers and suppliers to transact through the black market. 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
The sustained absence of an official channel for foreign exchange trading led to the 
emergence of competitive informal brokers and a large pool of firms trading foreign 
exchange outside the banking sector. These have been conducive to efficient matching 
of foreign exchange supply and demand in the black market. 
To contain black market trading of FCD, one policy option is to regulate domestic 
account transfers of FCD between the accounts of exporters and importers. At present, 
authorities tolerate these domestic account transfers and regulate the banks to charge $2 
for transfers between accounts within a bank, and $3 for transfers between accounts at 
different banks. Such low charges for domestic account transfers facilitate trading of 
FCD between exporters and importers. Regulating banks to raise the charges for 
domestic account transfer would to some extent encourage exporters to sell FCD to the 
banks where the exporters maintain deposits. However, as a potential side effect of such 
a regulatory change, an increase in transaction costs of trading FCD would push official 
exports into illegal exports. When changing the regulation on domestic account transfers 
of FCD, authorities need to supervise banks not to excessively exploit buyers and sellers 
in their foreign exchange retail transactions.  
In summary, the foreign exchange and trade regulations reforms succeeded in 
eliminating the disparities among various exchange rates, thus moving towards 
                                                   
13 Based on interviews with Myanmar’s exporters held in Yangon in August 2013. 
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exchange rate unification. However, the reforms are rather a necessary condition, but 
not the sufficient condition to transfer all foreign exchange trading from the black to 
official markets. Given the small pecuniary transaction cost, trading foreign exchange 
outside the banking sector remains prevalent. 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis of Exporters’ Choices of Foreign Exchange Trading Modes 
 
4.1 Data 
We conducted a survey of Myanmar private exporters to investigate how they choose 
modes for conversion of their export proceeds into the domestic currency. We held the 
survey in Yangon, the commercial capital of the country, in the period from August 
2013 through November 2013. By the time we started the survey, it was only for one 
year that authorised dealer banks had been able to operate foreign currency dealing with 
customers. Furthermore, the state banks (MFTB and MICB) had hardly undertaken 
foreign currency dealings with private firms. 
The sample of the survey comprised private exporters listed in the 2012 Export 
Statistics of Myanmar by Myanmar Survey Research (MSR 2013), which compiled 
export amounts by firms and products from the raw data of the Myanmar Customs for 
the 2012 calendar year. It must be recognised this database does not cover Myanmar’s 
exports completely; in particular it does not include any trade via land borders.14 Total 
exports in this database were $5,789 million, whereas the country’s total exports 
inclusive of land border trade were $8,888 million according to other official statistics.15 
Furthermore, while SEEs are small in number, they include the largest exporters of 
natural resources. The sum of exports for the top three SEEs, namely Myanma Oil and 
Gas Enterprise, Myanma Timber Enterprise, and Myanma Gems Enterprise, amounted 
to $3,038 million in this database. Total exports by the private sector in this database 
amounted to $2,698 million. 
The total number of exporters captured in the database is 1,460, of which 1,428 are 
private firms. We set a threshold for annual exports at $100,000 and exclude exporters 
below this threshold from the sample since they are considered to handle exports as a 
minor business.16 A total of 875 private firms were above the threshold, which account 
for 98.9 percent of the total private exports in the database. Table 4 presents these firms’ 
                                                   
14 Trade by land has been principally administrated by the Department of Border Trade under the 
Ministry of Commerce. 
15 From the Selected Monthly Economic Indicators.  
16 For example, they include shipments of imported machines for repair in foreign countries. 
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decomposition by major export items and by size. As shown in this table, Myanmar’s 
exports by private firms are highly concentrated in a small number of primary goods 
such as beans, fishery products and rice. 
 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
Out of the population of private exporters with annual exports above $100,000 in 
2012, we collected answers to the structured questionnaire from 99 firms. We first 
divided the population by annual export amount lager than $2 million or less and 
selected the sample firms from each stratified group proportionately.17 Although our 
sample does not necessarily represent the population and the sample size is small, it 
covers 11.3 percent of the entire population of private exporters above the threshold. 
We present a summary of the survey data in Table 5. In this table, we sort firms into 
larger firms with annual exports above $2 million and the remainder, who have exports 
between $2 million and $100,000. The survey questionnaire covered the general 
attributes of firms, relationship with banks, import business, and disposal of export 
revenues. 
 
[Table 5 near here] 
 
The survey results clearly confirm the prevalence of the black market for foreign 
exchange. A full 77 percent of surveyed firms sold export earnings in the black market 
during the three months prior to the survey interview. Those who did not sell export 
earnings include firms that had import businesses and used export proceeds for their 
own imports. Conversely, only three firms had sold export earnings to the banks, all of 
whom were large firms. 
The black market contained two transaction modes; one is to sell export earnings 
directly to familiar clients and the other is to sell them through intermediation by 
informal brokers. A large number of firms, regardless of their export size, used both 
modes. No distinct difference emerged between users of these two modes. 
Regarding firms’ relationships with banks, only 17 percent of firms surveyed have 
opened FCD accounts at Myanmar’s private banks. At the time of the survey, having an 
FCD account at a private bank was a prerequisite for exporters to be able to sell their 
                                                   
17 We filtered out companies with foreign ownership from the sample as they were small in number 
and concentrated in the garment and footwear industry. Thus, the sample firms were those under 
local ownership, either family or partners. 
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export proceeds in the official market since the state banks did not purchase foreign 
currency. During the survey, some firms reported that the private banks were soliciting 
them to open FCD accounts. No clear difference emerged between larger firms and the 
others in terms of having opened FCD accounts at Myanmar’s private banks. 
Eleven percent of firms surveyed did not have a bank account in the domestic 
currency. This is plausible considering Myanmar’s cash-based economy. These firms 
kept cash vaults in their offices rather than depositing cash in banks. Conversely, all the 
surveyed firms had an FCD account with a state bank, either MFTB or MICB, or both, 
as such accounts were required for the official export procedure before the entry of 
private banks into international banking services. 
Regarding loans from Myanmar’s private banks, 36 percent of firms had taken out 
loans at the time of the survey. In general, private credit is extremely scarce in 
Myanmar18; credit advanced to the private sector as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 2012 was 10.2 percent, which was the lowest in Southeast Asia (IMF 
2014). The gap in the proportion of firms taking loans was relatively high between large 
firms and small and medium firms. This implies that banks were more likely to 
approach and grant loans to larger exporters compared to small and medium exporters. 
Furthermore, all three firms that sold export earnings had bank loans. 
 
4.2 Probit Analysis on the Use of the Official Market 
We examine the determinants on choices of modes for currency trading using a Probit 
model analysis. Ideally, the dependent variable should be a binary variable of 
experience with selling export earnings to Myanmar’s private banks or not. However, 
there are only three such cases in the sample, which impedes using this as the dependent 
variable in a regression. Instead, we employ the binary variable of whether an exporter 
had a FCD account with Myanmar’s private banks as the dependent variable, since such 
an account was a prerequisite for an exporter to sell export proceeds to the banks. 
We include the following variables as explanatory variables in the specification of the 
regression model: logarithm of annual exports, age of firms, a dummy variable for firms 
taking domestic currency loans from Myanmar’s private banks, a dummy variable for 
conducting import business and an industry dummy variable for exporters of fishery 
products.  
The dummy variable for firms taking loans in domestic currency from Myanmar’s 
private banks is of particular interest. We consider banks’ economies of scope between 
lending and currency trading, which differs from how economies of scope are captured 
                                                   
18 See Turnell (2014) for the background of underdeveloped financial intermediation in Myanmar.  
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in the literature on banks (e.g., Clark 1988). We treat economies of scope as follows: 
from the banks’ viewpoint, exporters who sell a large amount of export proceeds can be 
considered creditworthy. By lending to these exporters, banks can save some of the 
screening and monitoring costs of lending. Given these savings in screening and 
monitoring costs, banks can then offer a higher buying rate of foreign exchange to 
exporters in order to compete with the narrow spreads of the black market. A positive 
sign on the coefficient of this dummy variable is interpreted as the presence of 
economies of scope between lending and foreign exchange trading.  
As for other control variables, first, it is expected that larger exporters are more likely 
to have opened FCD accounts as they have more human resources for financial 
management. Second, those exporters who also import are expected to be less likely to 
sell export earnings to the banks as they use them on their own. 
Table 6 summarises the estimation result. The dummy variable for bank loans has a 
positive sign, which is significant at a 10 percent significance level. Exporters’ taking 
domestic currency loans from Myanmar’s private banks are positively correlated with 
their having opened FCD accounts at these banks. Other control variables are not 
statistically significant. The log of annual exports has the expected positive sign. As for 
the dummy variable for conducting import business, its insignificance might be related 
to the fact that the dependent variable in the regression is the dummy variable for 
having opened FCD account at private banks rather than the dummy variable for selling 
FCD to private banks.19  
 
[Table 6 near here] 
 
To check the robustness of the above-mentioned result, we estimate the same 
equation using the sub-sample of the firms that have sold export earnings to any parties 
through either official or black markets in the past three months. The dummy variable 
for bank loans retains its positive sign, which is significant at a 10 percent significance 
level. 
We can interpret these results as preliminary evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
the exporters’ relationship with banks is linked with their use of banks for conversion of 
export revenues into the domestic currency. The empirical results are in line with the 
                                                   
19 We performed another Probit regression where the dependent variable is the dummy variable for 
sales in any modes and the independent variable is the dummy variable for conducting import 
business. The dummy variable for conducting import business has a significant negative sign, 
indicating that those firms having an import business were less likely to sell export earnings to any 
party. 
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strategy of private banks to offer to buy export proceeds at a preferential rate in 
exchange for their taking loans from the bank. In fact, the three firms that sold export 
earnings to the private banks also had loans from these banks. Based on the empirical 
results, we can infer that economies of scope in the banking business would facilitate 
the growth in foreign exchange trading in the official market. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite recent reforms to both the exchange rate regime and restrictions on 
international trade, the black market for foreign exchange is still prevalent among 
private exporters and importers in Myanmar. The abolition of the official peg of the 
Myanmar kyat to the SDR and the introduction of a managed float, along with the 
lifting of tight controls on imports referred to as the “export-first and import-second” 
policy, have mostly eliminated the segmentation of the black market and largely unified 
the official and black market exchange rates. Nonetheless, most of private exporters and 
importers still avoid the official bank-based foreign exchange market. 
A closer look at the black market reveals that pecuniary transaction costs are lower in 
the black market than in the official market. The absence of an official facility of foreign 
exchange trading for the private sector over the past two and a half decades had led to 
the emergence of a large pool of private firms trading foreign exchange mutually as well 
as efficient informal brokers, which has kept the transaction costs in the black market 
lower than those of the banks in the official market. 
Although the black market for foreign exchange is efficient in terms of narrow 
bid-ask spreads for individual users, it imposes substantial costs on Myanmar’s 
economy as a whole. The black market signifies decentralised holdings of foreign 
exchange, hampering accumulation of international reserves that could serve as a buffer 
against external shocks as well as collateral when the country seeks official sources of 
external financing. 
Our empirical analysis of private exporters’ choices of foreign exchange trading 
modes implies that firms taking domestic currency loans from Myanmar’s private banks 
are more ready to trade export earnings with banks. It is inferred that banks can compete 
with the black market’s narrow bid-ask spreads by exploiting economies of scope 
between lending and foreign exchange trading. A policy implication from the empirical 
analysis is that enhancing financial intermediation would also facilitate the transition 
from black to official markets for foreign exchange. This is a more efficient solution 
17 
 
than tightening regulations on black market transactions and domestic account transfers 
of FCD, which could have side effects of pushing official exports into illegal trade. 
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Table 1. 
Three dimensions of black market for foreign exchange 
 
Source: Author. 
  
Dimension Official Market Black Market
(1)
Price of
foreign exchange
Within
restricted range
With premium
over official rate
(2)
Sources and uses of
foreign exchange
Legal sources
and uses
Illegal sources
and uses
(3)
Trading counterpart of
foreign exchange
Authorised dealers
Unauthorised
buyers/sellers
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Table 2. 
Formal trading of foreign exchange and private sector international trade,  
January 2014 – December 2014 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Myanmar website; Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, Central 
Statistical Organization (CSO), Myanmar 
Notes 1/: Monthly average for January 2013 - September 2013. 
2/: Monthly average for January 2013 - December 2013. 
  
Monthly average
US dollar, million
Wholesale
Auction turnover 1/ 165.3                    0.38
Interbank dealing turnover 17.5                      0.04
Retail
Customer dealing turnover 110.2                    0.25
Private exports 2/ 434.4                    
Private imports 2/ 806.7                    
Ratio to
private exports
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Table 3. 
Quoted prices for the US dollar on 28 August, 2013 
 
Source: Informal market dealers in Yangon, Myanmar 
  
Dearler (broker)
buying rate
Dealer (broker)
selling rate
Unit: Kyat per US dollar
Export earnings rates 967 968
US dollar notes rates 967 968
Authorised dealer bank rates 965 974
Central Bank reference rate 973
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Table 4.  
Distribution of private exporters by size and items, 2012 
 
Source: MSR (2013). 
  
Major Export Items
Exports
below
USD 2mil.,
above
100,000
Exports
above
USD 2mil.
Total
1 Beans 869,180        3,292            163 101 264
2 Garment and Footware 633,874        5,372            42 76 118
3 Fishery 492,770        2,392            148 58 206
4 Rice 226,247        3,901            34 24 58
5 Rubber 160,302        4,580            19 16 35
6 Mining Products 101,108        4,596            19 3 22
7 Sesame and Other Agri. Products 94,683          1,435            53 13 66
8 Timber and Wood 35,869          732               46 3 49
9 Others 53,391          937               52 5 57
Total 2,667,425     576 299 875
Average
Export
per firm
 (USD ,000)
Total Exports
(USD ,000)
Number of Firms
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Table 5.  
Summary of the survey data 
 
Source: Survey of export firms 2013. 
below
USD 2 mil.
above 0.1 mil.
above
USD 2 mil.
Number of  f irms 64 35 99
Industries :
Garment 3 4 7
Beans 22 20 42
Fishery  products 15 5 20
Rice 3 3 6
Others 21 3 24
Annual export  amount ,  average (USD mil l ion) 0.87             7.85             3.34             
Age,  average (years) 11.7             12.2             11.9             
Ownership --% of  f irms
Family  owned 78% 69% 75%
Partnership 22% 31% 25%
Have Kyat  bank account--% of  f irms 89% 89% 89%
Doing import  bus iness--% of  f irms 48% 51% 49%
Take bank loans f rom Myanmar private banks--% of  f irms 33% 43% 36%
Have USD account  at  Myanmar private banks--% of  f irms 16% 20% 17%
Have sold export  earnings--% of  f irms 77% 77% 77%
(Mult iple choice)
To famil iar c l ients 59% 60% 60%
To brokers 48% 43% 46%
To private banks 0% 9% 3%
Category
Firms with Annual Exports All
Firms
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Table 6. 
Probit analysis on the determinants for opening a foreign currency deposit account at 
Myanmar’s private banks 
 
Source: Survey of export firms 2013. 
 
  
Dependent variable
Sample
Independent variables StandardError
Marginal
Effect
Standard
Error
Marginal
Effect
Log of annaul exports 0.1449 0.1117 0.034 0.1480 0.1320 0.029
Age of firm -0.0117 0.0244 -0.003 -0.0139 0.0288 -0.003
Dummy (taking loans from Myanmar bank) 0.6211 * 0.3296 0.144 0.7089 * 0.3691 0.141
Dummy (doing import business) -0.0902 0.3011 -0.021 -0.4140 0.3488 -0.082
Dummy (Fishery industry) 0.7404 0.3635 0.172 0.5118 0.4569 0.101
Constant -1.2765 *** 0.3993 -1.2616 *** 0.4616
Prob>chi2 0.0920 0.0863
Pseudo R-squared 0.0907 0.0968
Number of observations 99 76
Have FCD account in private bank
(Yes, 1; No, 0)
Have FCD account in private bank
 (Yes, 1; No, 0)
All firms Firms with sales of export earningｓ in
past three months
Coefficient Coefficient
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Figure 1. 
Black market exchange rate trends, September 2009 – December 2013 
 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Yangon Office. 
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Figure 2. 
Trends in Central Bank reference rate and black market rate,  
April 2012 – December 2014 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Myanmar website, and E-trade Myanmar. 
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